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BOOK REVIEWS
EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By Leo Katcher.t New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967. Pp. 502. $8.50.
When Earl Warren was asked which of his opinions he considered the
most significant, he replied: "Reynolds v. Sims,1 of course." With the so-
called "one man-one vote" decision directing the reapportionment of the
Alabama state legislature, the Supreme Court, having previously rejected
the argument that the issue constituted a political question, acted to
correct the self-perpetuating situation of unequal legislative districts.
Under Chief Justice Warren, the Supreme Court has acted in many areas
where it has observed the existence of a vacuum and the necessity for a
remedy.
In this political biography of Earl Warren, the author points out that
an analysis of Warren's views during the time when he served as District
Attorney of Alameda County and later as Attorney General of California
did not presage either his outlook as Governor of California or the
emergence of the activist judicial philosophy which Warren has exhibited
on the Supreme Court. Mr. Katcher's explanation, however, is simply that
Warren maintained a certain flexibility with respect to his ideas at a time
of life when most people's views have solidified to the point of rigidity.
This simplistic approach to his complex subject is the author's principal
flaw.
There is no question that Chief Justice Warren possesses the flexible
quality which the author attributes to him, but the fascinating questions
of why Warren moved in the direction he did and how the different types
of offices he held influenced the trend of his views is largely unexplored.
The transition from local elective office to the national judiciary, for
example, is one in which the office by its nature exerts a broadening influ-
ence. Moreover, a judge whose entire career has been in elective office and
who has been charged with the responsibility of solving problems and
producing results may be less inclined to bow to precedent or notions of
judicial restraint when faced with problems long neglected and susceptible
to judicial resolution.
The author, however, has largely chosen to avoid some of the interest-
ing questions posed by Earl Warren's career and to concentrate instead
on recounting numerous comments made by former associates of Warren,
many of which are general and unilluminating cliches. In so doing,
the author has amassed information about a number of cases which
Warren handled as well as interesting sidelights on his conduct in
t Author; former city editor of the New York Post.
1. 377 U.S. 533 (1963).
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the offices of District Attorney and Attorney General. He notes, for
example, that when Warren decided to put an end to corruption involving
bail bondsmen, he called in those whom he suspected and warned them
that if their objectionable activities did not cease, he would conduct an
investigation aimed at obtaining indictments and eventual convictions.
In this situation, his associates recall, Warren believed a warning should
be given first. " 'He told us never to hit anyone from the blind side.' "'
Such insights serve to create some understanding of Warren's approach
to these two offices.
The author, although obviously an admirer of the Chief Justice, has
also made an effort to include the viewpoints of those who not only
differed from Warren but were critical of his motives. He thus succeeds
in presenting a general view of Warren's career along with some interest-
ing character observations. The author's style, which tends at times to be
over-dramatic, is, perhaps, best suited to his discussion of Warren's
activities during his campaign for Vice President on the Dewey ticket
and his subsequent efforts to secure the 1952 Republican Presidential
nomination.
It was apparently not the author's purpose to undertake a deep
analysis of the significant Supreme Court decisions during Warren's
tenure as Chief Justice. He mentions the principal ones in each area of the
law, simplifying them and explaining their effects in journalistic terms.
Of Mapp v. Ohio,' for example, Katcher says: "Out the window went
many police procedures such as roundups and 'rousts' * * * The police
'dragnet' was made obsolete. ' 4 This view of the Court, easily understand-
able to the layman, emphasizing not the reasoning which led to the con-
clusion, but the dramatic effect of the result reached achieves Mr.
Katcher's evident purpose to present a solely political view of the Chief
Justice. Those interested in an in-depth or scholarly analysis of the truly
great accomplishments of the Supreme Court under Earl Warren will
have to await another study.
Hon. Kenneth B. Keating*
2. L. KATCHER, EARL WARR N: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 50 (1967).
3. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 442 (1967).
* B.A., University of Rochester; LL.B., Harvard University. Associate Judge, Court of
Appeals, State of New York.
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THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY. By Rita James Simon.t
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967. Pp. xiv, 268. $10.00.
This book is almost worth its weight in gold. It is 268 pages and costs
$10.00.
I know that Little, Brown and Company is a "prestige publisher"
similar to The Plant where They did the Ten Tablets or Justinian's print-
ing house. But just why do all law books cost so much?'
It is getting so that law books, without "interesting pictures" cost even
more than comparably page-numbered medical books, the latter of which
are generally done on better paper and are, with their illustrations and
pictures, more expensive to produce.
Anyway, I suppose a good law book, like a good lawyer, should be
expensive-except in the case of law review articles and book reviews
(and lectures) which we good lawyers do for free.
I hope that this is not a wilderness voice crying for more reasonable
prices for law books from the "publishers' trust." With my own recently
published book,2 I practically had a D-Day (with my publisher) over the
Christmas holidays getting the two volumes down to a reasonable price.'
In The Law Revolt, I had occasion to discuss the jury and the defense
of insanity but not nearly as thoroughly as has Professor Simon. Indeed,
I wondered whether all of these dissections of the jury and its delibera-
tions do not dishearten laymen in their appreciation of the jury system.
The greatest capacity of the jury is its humanity and we all know that
errancy is a built-in ingredient of humanity, i.e., to err is human. A com-
puterized, blue-stockinged, 100% all-the-time-perfect jury would not do.
At least for our society it would not because a jury's benefit lies in its
being a mirror of community conscience. It is a microcosm of the city,
each of which moralities, if not laws, are different.
Show me a jury in operation and tell me its verdict and I will know
more about the culture of the particular city, its economics, its cosmo-
politanism, its provincialism, the care accorded in its hospitals by its
doctors and the safety of its freeways, than if I were to call as expert
witnesses specialists in each of these areas.
t Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Illinois.
1. The obvious unsatisfactory answer is that "so few are sold." Law book companies
have a price-fixing combine that would make Rockefeller's (The First-the "evil one")
Standard Oil the prototype of laissez faire by comparison. See, e.g. the Department of
Justice's recent anti-trust suit against the publisher's for price-fixing the library editions of
children's books at 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1968 Trade Cas.) 1 45,067, at 52,647.
2. M. BELLI, THE LAW REVOLT (1967).
3. This is a book laymen (I hope) will buy. But they will not at $37.50.
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A jury cannot be "taken apart" like a watch to see "what makes it
tick," although Professor Simon makes a pretty good attempt and arrives
at some interesting conclusions. Whether they are valid or "just statis-
tics" is another question. We have found no way yet of categorizing or
putting into pints and quarts or measuring with feet and yards, morality,
ethics or even equity, for that matter.
I do not mean to say that a jury has "open season" on law or that it has
a built-in right to be capricious.
A jury is a safety valve to a community's too rigid morality. But since
commodities of community conscience cannot be measured, when we take
the system apart to pry into it and try detailedly to measure it, we may
traumatize the very delicate unseen and unmeasurable anatomy which has
made the system work for many years.
And work it does. I have never seen a jury after some thirty years of
practice which did not try to do its honest and conscientious best. And
this refers to that jury in Dallas, Texas. I think that jury was exemplary.
The verdict of that jury was not the result of that jury's misdeliberations;
it was the fault of the trial judge in not changing venue.
The appellate court ordered venue changed in reversing the lower
court's decision.4 That jury did its job too well. The function for which
that jury was impaneled was to reflect community conscience in Dallas at
that time. Dallas "unconsciously" wanted to plump Jack Ruby into the
public abattoir at any cost in order to prove that it was a law-abiding city.
And so spoke the appellate court.
Plato, living today, would see that his "Myth of the Marketplace" and
"Myth of the Cave," the imagery and semantics by which really too many
of us are bound instead of good thinking, is most evident in the jury
room in a "not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity" case. Contrary to public
opinion, this is not an easy defense to prove. It is not a defense readily
acceptable by the jury. This is not because many poor devils are not
"insane" when they commit a crime, but because editorials and cartoons
and writers have propagandized this defense into "the last resort of the
clever criminal lawyer."
"It is easy for anyone to act insane" think jurors. "I won't be fooled"
they resolve. Cartoonists, editorialists, unknowledgeable politicians,
super-patriotic law enforcement agencies all contribute to the prejudice
against the plea.
But it is not easy for one to "act insane." I have hesitated in placing a
defendant on the stand in a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity case because
I was afraid that he would "act" anything but insane. I thought Jack
4. Rubenstein v. State, - Tex. Crim. -, 407 S.W.2d 793 (1966).
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Ruby was "insane." But a principal reason why I did not have him testify
was that he would have made the supreme effort to "show the jury"
("fool them") that he was sane. And they would have been "fooled" with
an "I told you so !"
Professor Simon's book purports to show what jurors consider in the
insanity plea and what influences them most. It is valuable to the trial
lawyer even in disagreement with Professor Simon's conclusions because
considerations, perhaps otherwise overlooked, can now at least be ad-
dressed to elements of jury motivation.
I am in disagreement with some of the book's conclusions. I think that
the straight-jacketing and barbaric M'Naghten Rule has caused many
unfair convictions. Simon, no. I believe that an insanity "test" which is
purposely amorphous and ill-defined ("liberal," if one will) will give the
psychiatrists more of an opportunity for expert testimony help on "re-
sponsibility" to the jury. It would also allow a jury more freedom to
exercise its principal function in voting community consciousness. After
all, if we had a negligence definition (the reasonably prudent person) as
restrictive as M'Naghten, it would drive all negligence lawyers crazy!
Minus these reservations, however, Professor Simon's book remains a
serious, sincere and valuable study.
Melvin M. Belli*
LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE ENGLISH
LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-1965. By Brian Abel-Smitht and Robert
Stevens.$ Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. xiv, 504.
$11.00.
Nemo iudex in causa sua. It is a significant vindication of this honoured
maxim of English Law that the first critical analysis of the social role of
the legal profession in England has come, not from practising lawyers,
but from a Professor of Social Administration and a Yale Professor of
Law (albeit an Englishman). But while the result is a major work which
should, alongside the generally complacent books on advocacy and pro-
fessional ethics, be essential reading for present and future English
lawyers, that recommendation must be coupled with a warning that, in
some matters, the work is far from being the objective sociological
analysis it purports to be for it argues a case against the legal profession
which is sometimes regrettably over-stated.
* A.B., University of California; LL.B., Boalt Hall. Partner of Belli, Ashe, Ellison,
Choulos, Cone and Harper, Los Angeles and San Francisco, California.
t Professor of Sociology Administration, London School of Economics.
1 Professor of Law, Yale University.
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The English legal profession divides horizontally into sectional group-
ings ascending in strict order of labour division. At the foot, solicitors'
managing clerks ("legal executives"), then solicitors, barristers' clerks,
junior barristers, senior barristers (Queen's Counsel), Benchers of the
Inns of Court and, at the apex, the judiciary, itself segmented into a
hierarchy. Essentially, this stratification has changed little through the
centuries. But this study convincingly demonstates that, once smaller
sections, such as attorneys, scriveners, serjeants and pleaders had been
absorbed into the two major branches of the profession, power has con-
centrated around two nuclei, the Law Society, which has represented the
solicitors since 1823, and the Bar Council, summoned into existence in
1895 to consider "all matters affecting the profession, including the main-
tenance of the rights and privileges of the Bar.. .. "'
Like all trade union executives, these bodies have been concerned, for
the most part, to maintain a rate of remuneration for their members
sufficient to uphold (and, in the case of solicitors, improve) their status,
especially during times of inflation. Thus, in 1944, the Law Society
achieved an upward revision of fifty per cent in the scale of conveyancing
charges which had been standardized in 1883. These "Schedule I"
charges are calculated as a percentage of the value of the property trans-
ferred, but this built-in regulator had broken down with wartime control
of property values. In 1953, lump sum charges under "Schedule II" were
substituted for the former itemized account. These charges were enforced
as minimum fee scales by strict control of undercutting. In 1958, amongst
other revisions, barristers secured a one hundred per cent increase in fees
for interlocutory work which had remained static for many years owing to
the supervision over these fees exercised by Taxing Masters of the High
Court. But, most significant for the Bar, especially its younger members,
was the government's decision in 1960 to pay genuine remuneration for
legally aided criminal cases, resulting, in some instances, of increases of
up to ten times the former nominal fee.
The facts, however, are presented so as to convey the impression that
these increases were grossly excessive. But the picture is a distorted one.
For example, it is stated that "[f] rom 1939 prices had multiplied three-
fold, but solicitors' incomes had probably multiplied six or sevenfold. ' 2
This is based on an annual average income of £400 in 1939, rising to
£3,000 in 1964. The former figure derives from a statement by the Law
Society in 1939, a source which elsewhere, on this topic, the authors
justifiably consider suspect. In fact, a study by Dr. Routh3 puts the
1. Bar Committee, Annual Statement and the First of the General Council of the Bar
1894-95, at 2.
2. B. ABEL-SwiTi AND R. STEVENS, LAWYERS Am THE CoURTS: A SocioLoOcAL STuDY




average annual income for solicitors in 1935-37 at £1,238. So the increase
was probably not far from threefold. Even more interesting is Dr. Routh's
comparative analysis by occupation of earnings and their increase. The
average earnings of barristers, solicitors and medical general practitioners
in 1956 expressed as a percentage of their average income in 1913-14
was, respectively, 425, 367 and 667. These increases are by no means
disproportionate to those in other occupations, for the percentage increase
(for the period 1913-14 to 1960) for business managers was 925, clerks,
689, foremen, 898, skilled workers, 804 and unskilled workers, 849. The
legal profession simply kept abreast with a general rise in income levels.
Nor is the actual average income itself excessive in comparison with other
professions. In 1955-56, of the combined incomes at the median and
upper and lower quartiles of barristers, solicitors, doctors and dentists,
the barristers' proportion was only 77% of the average, and that of the
solicitors, only 93%. Since publication of the book under review, an
examination of solicitors' remuneration by the Prices and Incomes Board
has shown that the percentage increase from 1955-56 to 1966 (82% at
the mean; 88% at the median) differed little from the increase in other
occupations. If the criticisms of the writers had been offset by this back-
ground, they would have fallen into truer perspective.
Professor Abel-Smith and Professor Stevens are more justified in their
critical exposure of the methods used to ensure that income. The solicitors
having lost ground to accountants and bankers, coupled with rigid de-
marcation between the two branches of the profession, each side clung
tenaciously to the time-and-money-consuming restrictive practices in the
remaining areas where their respective monopolies operated, viz., in the
case of solicitors, that of the transfer of land and the sole right to counsel,
and, for barristers, the sole right of audience in the Supreme Court and
House of Lords. It is revealed that attempts to institute an efficient
system of land registration have been continuously thwarted by solicitors
since 1815 until opposition eventually faded away in the 1950's when
fees for transferring registered land were substantially increased. The
Bar opposed the establishment of County Courts in 1846, and fought
every increase of jurisdiction of those courts (in which solicitors may
appear and which are cheaper to the litigant). The Bar's opposition to the
extension of undefended divorce jurisdiction to County Courts was over-
come after the book was published. Not only has simplification of inter-
locutory work been opposed, but also the more far-reaching proposals to
establish a Court of Criminal Appeal (achieved in 1907) and a Ministry
of Justice (as yet unrealized). The two-counsel rule, requiring a "junior"
to be briefed whenever a Queen's Counsel appeared and entitling him to a
fee amounting to two-thirds of that of his leader was entrenched by the
Bar Council. Furthermore, any barrister appearing on a circuit other than
3. ROUTH, OccuPAnoN AND PAY Ix GREAT BP=AiN, 1906-1960 (1965).
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his "own" was required to exact a special fee and also engage a member
of the local circuit. The exacting of "refreshers" and brief fees was sub-
ject to some abuse. The authors describe the growing criticism of these
practices, and the government Monopolies Commission is currently
reviewing restrictive practices in all professions, including the Bar. The
defensive response to these external pressures probably accounts for the
extraordinary emotional outburst during recent unsuccessful litigation
challenging the barristers' traditional immunity from suit for negligence
in court when a Lord Justice of Appeal said that the barrister-defendant
had been "treated abominably by the bringing of this action and the
conduct of the plaintiff and those who have sought to embarrass the Bar
for their own selfish and opinionated ends."4 The case was reported too
late for inclusion in their book, but the authors refer to an interesting Bill
to render barristers accountable, introduced, equally unsuccessfully, as
long ago as 1876.
Scarcely more edifying is the history of the attitude of the Inns of
Court towards legal education, which is shown to have been, until very
recently, little short of scandalous. A perceptive chapter describes the
change in judicial attitudes to creative law-making from the controversial
period at the turn of the century to the "withdrawal" in the 1950's. But
the discussion of more recent developments is less happy. It is true that
the judges have become more "interventionist" and that this has led to
some criticism, but the authors abandon objective valuation for simple
quotations from popular press and partisan sources. On the Enahoro
Case,5 which is misspelt in the book, they merely comment that it
"4... was regarded by many as an example of the judiciary deferring too
easily to the Executive."6 It is difficult to see how the courts could have
acted otherwise in that affair, and this reviewer believes that most of the
other cases alluded to in this section7 are perfectly defensible on legal and
policy grounds. Mere citation of one-sided comment is both uncritical
and misleading.
Errors of detail are few. There is, for example, a momentary confusion
between Lord Reid and Lord Radcliffe;I it was the latter who retired in
1964. But the bulk of the book is superbly documented and, despite the
points at which the presentation has been criticized, remains irresistibly
convincing.
J. M. Eekelaar*
4. Rondel v. W., [1966] 3 All. E.R. 670 (C.A.), per Danckwerts, L.J.
5. R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, [1963] 2 Q.B. 455.
6. ABEL-SIITH AND STEENS at 306.
7. E.g., Ward v. James, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 455 (C.A.); Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C.
1129; Att'y Gen. v. Mulholland, [1963] 2 W.L.R. 658 (C.A.); Overseas Tankship Ltd. v.
Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd., [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.).
8. ABEL-SITH AND STEVENS at 296.
* Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford.
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HUGO BLACK AND THE SUPREME COURT: A SYMPosiuM. Edited by
Stephen Parks Strickland.t Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Com-
pany, Inc., 1967. Pp. xxix, 365. $10.00.
Mr. Strickland's Hugo Black and the Supreme Court: A Symposium
contains essays by nine contributors about Mr. Justice Black. The essays
attempt to analyze and summarize the views of Justice Black on many
subjects. Some deal with Black's views and activities in specific legal
fields such as taxation, anti-trust and federal procedure. Others inquire
into the Justice's values and philosophies. Another group deals with
specific topics such as race and the Bill of Rights and the Justice's views
thereon. It is apparent from the tone and contents of these essays that all
of the contributors greatly admire Justice Black's legal philosophy, out-
look and growth over the years. All of the essays analyze the topic with
which they deal but they are not at all critical of Justice Black's approach
or views on the problems covered in the particular essays.
Many of the essays are exciting, especially those dealing with Justice
Black's views on the Constitution. None of them give any unusual insight
into the personality of Mr. Justice Black or discuss his relationship
with the other members of the Supreme Court. This, I believe, will be a
disappointment to the members of the practicing bar.
The Symposium fails to contain any essay directly antagonistic to the
views of Mr. Justice Black. In fact, none of the essays are really critical
of Justice Black. This, I believe, makes the Symposium somewhat one-
sided or unbalanced. Obviously, in view of Mr. Justice Black's intellectual
ability and personality, there must have been numerous conflicts with his
colleagues. Since his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Black has
succeeded in turning into majority decisions his views which at first repre-
sented lonesome dissents. An essay on how this was accomplished would
greatly help to round out the Symposium.
In reading these essays, one is struck by the change of many of the
majority doctrines over the last thirty years. The Symposium drives
home the point that many of these changes were brought about under
Mr. Justice Black's leadership. His dissents in many cases became ma-
jority opinions in a relatively short period of time. For example, compare
the dissenting opinion in Betts v. Brady1 with the majority opinion in
Gideon v. Wainwright.'
The essays are well reasoned and beautifully written. They certainly
contribute to the understanding of Mr. Justice Black who without a doubt
is one of the outstanding personalities sitting on the United States Su-
preme Court. B. A. Karlowitz*
t B.A., Emory University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University.
1. 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
* A.B., University of Pittsburgh; LL.B., Georgetown University. Partner in the law-
firm of Patterson, Crawford, Arensberg & Dunn, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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